Shifting the Iron Curtain of Kantian Peace:
NATO Expansion and the Magyars

“For us, this is a new beginning.”
– Romanian president Ion Iliescu, former communist minister

“This day will become history. We are making a decision that will finally put an end to the era of the divisions … and the cold war.”
– Polish president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, former communist minister

“I hope that this step will be a reminder to those forces in Russia who may still think in terms of the former Soviet empire that those days are gone … they are on the dustheap of history.”
– Latvian president Vaira Vike-Freiberga

As the head of Latvia’s fledgling military, Colonel Graube, notes, the ascension of the Latvian state into NATO is part of a much larger process than military security alone: “This means we are moving to our goal, which is to be a firm and permanent part of the West.” Though such a viewpoint is common amongst the populaces of ascending member states, it helps raise numerous questions as to several inherent contradictions in the reasoning behind NATO expansion. To begin with, why are numerous states that just over ten years ago regained their sovereign independence from the Soviet empire so suddenly willing to join a new, hegemonic backed Western empire? Furthermore, what are the true reasons underlying NATO members’ interest in expanding their military alliance into nation-states with military forces comprised of only 5,500 members (i.e., Latvia)?

There is more at play in NATO expansion than simple geopolitical security as defined by the international relations (IR) field. Indeed, it will be argued that above and beyond security for Central Europe, contemporary NATO expansion is a moment in the

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
cycle of the United States’ rise to world power. Moreover, it will be illustrated that ascension of Central and Eastern European states into NATO may represent the final surrender of the socialist modernity as global competitor to the West. In this historical battlefield between Eastern and Western modernities, the socialist modernity that dominated over much of the region’s twentieth century history is now reviled by these civil societies and viewed as the antithesis of modernity. In the meantime, the Western lifestyle of mass consumption and suburbanism, as well as other dominant core processes from Western Europe in general, have raised the flag of market capitalism and democratic institutions in these states, filling the power vacuum just as quickly as the Soviet red stars came down. In this way, NATO is becoming increasingly synonymous with a “zone of peace” – wherein all members ascribe to democracy, free-trade, and interdependent relations. By joining NATO, new member states are making a political effort to shed the yoke of the failed Soviet modernity and join the hegemonic led “Western” world (i.e., become “part of Europe”). By enlisting the holistic framework of the capitalist world-economy as the underlying structure in which NATO expansion takes place, it is possible to cross-analyze why Central European states desire to join NATO with what exactly NATO might expect to gain in return from expansion into former enemy states.

The following research is based solely on archival study of both Hungarian reactions to NATO expansion and NATO’s official publications during its continuing expansion. That is, the domestic glee and turmoil resulting from surrendering state sovereignty to the hegemonic institution will be analyzed, as well as what the United States gains through the institution’s expansion. Using comparative analysis to highlight the contradiction between NATO expansion (at a point in time when NATO matters less

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7 Ibid.
David Holley, "Nato Grows, Shifts Focus to Terrorism," The Los Angeles Times, November 22, 2002.
Weir, "Baltics Step from Russia's Shadow into Western Club."
than ever) and why states such as Hungary overwhelmingly desire to join the organization, several theoretical scenarios will emerge. More than just for security’s sake, Hungary desires to be “modern,” a member of Western society, and to separate itself from the past Soviet modernity it was shackled to over the past 45 years. However, with this desire domestic and international tensions will arise within Hungarian society, particularly as the US attempts to use Hungary to its own advantage (e.g., in the war on terrorism).

The rest of this chapter will unfold in the following manner. First, the history and structure of NATO will be reviewed, as well as its dynamic role in international geopolitics over the last 50 years. This will segue into analysis of NATO’s “success” as defined within its Charter and through the concept of Kantian peace – has NATO provided international peace as an organization connecting interdependent economies? Furthermore, whose peace does NATO represent? A review of the US hegemony’s role within the organization and its instrumentalist purpose for forging a hegemonic order will be conducted. How and why does the US use NATO? These questions will transition into defining the purpose of contemporary NATO expansion within the context of the Soviet Union’s demise. Finally, analysis of “who gains what” from NATO in the contemporary geopolitical order will be conducted by looking at the Hungarian condition within the NATO expansion process.

**NATO – Place and Role in Current History**

NATO was forged at the beginning of the Cold War between the emerging US hegemony and the USSR, the only formidable resistance faced by the US after the Second World War. Under US guidance, and using the United Nations Charter to support their claims that a military alliance treaty was legal, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was born on April 4, 1949, with twelve states signing the NATO Charter: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.8 The reason for the alliance’s development was officially to promote a “secure Europe,” but due to its quick creation following the Berlin crisis and a communist coup in Czechoslovakia, NATO was quite overtly an act whereby

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the US was guaranteeing the security of free, democratic states that were partaking in the open market economy – it was not necessarily offering security to all of “Europe,” as Hungary discovered during the 1956 uprising.

NATO is a military agreement between all signatory states to aid one another in case of an attack by another, outside, force. That is, an attack on one member state is an attack on all member states. This unity of force is achieved through member states’ agreement to surrender certain aspects of their individual sovereignties to this transnational organization in order to ensure against hostile takeover by other states. Originally NATO was established as a united front against any potential Soviet military incursion into Western Europe with the backing and membership of the US superpower and its Canadian neighbor. Thus, throughout the Cold War NATO continued to grow, as new states decided to join for the benefits that mutual security could bring – eventually NATO expanded over the sovereignty of Turkey, Greece, West Germany, and Spain. NATO coalesced the militaries of Western European states within one overarching structure of control primarily under US guidance. Not only did this treaty ensure the security of Western Europe from conventional Soviet attack, but also, it allowed for the deployment of US short range missiles in Europe to balance the Soviet nuclear threat to these states. Furthermore, the treaty virtually insured against the attack of member states against one another, offering Western Europe its first real semblance of security from inter-state war in over 100 years – though disagreements between Turkey and Greece often threatened to disrupt the peace. Though the US created several other containment pacts – including the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization in the Middle East (CENTRO) – NATO stood out as the primary one due to the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of Western Europe to the US.

After the fall of communism, particularly the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, many argued that NATO’s central purpose had disappeared and that it would likely thereafter whither. However, over the past decade NATO has held numerous summit meetings to redefine its primary purpose. Arguing that the treaty has always been about security, NATO policy after the Cold War has been one of expanding the alliance eastward to include states recently gaining independence from communist regimes. States previously lying, or not existing at all, in the Soviet sphere of power are being
admitted to the treaty organization as long as they demonstrate successful transition to open market economies and democratic governments. The policy of NATO expansion is premised upon an implicit strategy, which O’Tuathail terms “enlargement geopolitics”: the diffusion of democracy and the free-market principles through the guise of pan-institutions, in which those incorporated will not wage war on one another, and thus, in the case of NATO, will stabilize Europe from violent conflict that might otherwise erupt and disrupt the world order.9

Looking back at its history, NATO has been largely successful at maintaining peace between states and nations that traditionally have waged war against one another (e.g., France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and United States). Buffered against the Warsaw Pact, NATO played a role in preventing Soviet military incursion into Western Europe. Thus, overall, NATO has performed astonishingly well at containing European inter-state disagreements within its institution and preventing violent conflict amongst member states – as well as between member and non-member states. Thus, it only makes sense that NATO’s recent goal has been to expand the number of states in its jurisdictional framework to further the territory enveloped by this institution of proto-Kantian peace.

Due to its geographic location within and across the historically volatile continent of Europe, NATO more obviously epitomizes Kant’s “zones of peace” argument than many other international institutions. Immanuel Kant argued that a universalist peace is attainable and that societies are inherently striving for such a peace, even if their overt pronouncements would lead one to believe otherwise.10 He believed that universal peace is an evolutionary process, not yet attained, and is likely to develop in stages – first through specific zones of peace that coexist and, when these zones of peace eventually become interdependent, they will envelop all of civil society. The true underpinnings of conflict within global civil society are ideological, not necessarily national. States simply represent a means of social organization loosely based around the concept of the nation, but they do not demarcate the boundaries of human identity and interaction. The

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ideological battles that ensue (e.g., communism versus democracy; command economy versus capitalism; Islam versus Western atheism; et cetera) in the process of universally uniting human society cut through state boundaries. Once states settle into the same ideological camp (e.g., democratization) and garner enough economic interaction and codependence, they will eventually settle into peace with one another – establishing zones of peace.\textsuperscript{11}

Kantian peace is based on three elements: democratization, codependence as established through economic interaction, and joint membership in international institutions.\textsuperscript{12} The first two Kantian principles are general prerequisites before joining NATO; whereas, the third principle is manifest in NATO itself. NATO represents an institution bonding together the military organizations of states that agree upon the common ideology of democratic government and free trade. NATO ties these states together above and beyond simple economic and political selfishness at the state level, and propels these states to work in unison for the ideological ideal of a “democratic peace.”

However, universalism as defined by Kant will result in ideological battles between the universalist camp (in this case NATO states) and other, non-universalist enemies:

“The rules that sustain coexistence and social intercourse among states should be ignored if the imperatives of [universalism] require it. Good faith with heretics has no meaning, except in terms of tactical convenience; between the elect and the damned, the liberators and the oppressed, the question of mutual acceptance of rights to sovereignty or independence does not arise.”\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

Hedley Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}.

\textsuperscript{13} Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}. 


Put in this light, NATO has succeeded as an institution of interdependence for democratic states in defeating the Soviet “heretical” resistance and in opening up new neighboring states to the ideological underpinnings of NATO’s zone of peace: democracy, open trade, and international institutions. However, what is missing from this theoretical argument are discussions concerning what institution has the power to continually propel this universalist battle? Furthermore, with such an inordinate amount of power, why would this institution, e.g., a superpower state, promote universalism instead of attempting to subjugate the world?

**Peace, but Whose and for What Gain?**

The actual North Atlantic Treaty is remarkably basic and to the point. It begins with a five sentence preamble stating that the states signing the treaty are “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”\(^\text{14}\) Essentially the treaty can be read as a direct indictment against those who might militarily confront liberal democracies in Europe – liberal democracies that comprise a large part of the core states in the capitalist world-economy. Thus, following Kant’s analysis of international conflict being the clash of universalism and other non-universalist ideologies, it is of no surprise that immediately following NATO inception, the Soviet Union protested that it was illegal under the UN Charter, and upon losing, formed its own alliance – the Warsaw Pact. The universalist battle had begun – but is NATO really an institution used by democracies to maintain and spread liberal universalism or is it something more insidious? Evidence supports the argument that NATO was created, and has since been maneuvered, by a powerful actor in the geopolitical order – the world hegemony.

The US rose to hegemony from the ashes of the Second World War. World hegemony is defined by a single state’s ability to dominate the world economically, which in turn results in technological and political leadership at the global scale. The United States began its rise to hegemony during the United Kingdom’s downfall at the end of the nineteenth century. Competition between the UK and Germany for the global

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\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., p. 527.
leadership position eventually plunged the world into chaos – beginning with the First
World War and culminating with the end of the Second World War.15

In the past, hegemony has gone through a cycle lasting approximately 100 years,
and during this cycle its primary role is to ensure and maintain political and economic
stability at the global scale. Toward the end of its cycle, competitive states have
attempted to usurp the hegemony, which often leads to great instability such as that
witnessed in the first half of the twentieth century. The world hegemony is dependent
upon stability and order in the international political economy, because it maintains the
most dominant domestic market in the world and only through stable and consistent
trading can it maintain its position of power. After the Second World War, with no direct
damage to its infrastructure during the conflict, the United States not only dominated in
production and trade, but it stood in a position to finance the rebuilding of Europe and
rise to high hegemony.16

However, hegemonic power is not derived simply from a dominant economy
alone. Even before World War Two had officially ended, the United States began setting
up institutions of extra-territorial control to help solidify its position within the world-
economy at large – these extra-territorial institutions fostered an interdependent
community between participating states. The United Nations, the World Bank, and other
organizations were established as instrumentalist tools in order to solidify power and
forge stability once the war ended.17 With these organizations taking root and gaining
acceptance by the international community by the war’s end, the US was ready to take
the reigns of hegemonic leadership. NATO was one such institution of hegemonic extra-
territoriality.

15 John Agnew, "The United States and American Hegemony," in Political Geography of the Twentieth
16 Agnew, "The United States and American Hegemony."
Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century.
17 Agnew, "The United States and American Hegemony."
Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century.
Giovanni Arrighi et al., "Geopolitics and High Finance," in Chaos and Governance in the Modern World
System, ed. Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver, Contradictions of Modernity (Minneapolis: Univ. of
Minnesota Press, 1999).
Through this military, codependent institution, the United States successfully gained influence over various aspects of fourteen European militaries. Furthermore, it had largely secured the markets of Western Europe from the competing Soviet Empire. With stability largely intact over Western Europe, the capitalist markets of the world-economy could interact harmoniously and the hegemony could feed its need to exploit capital from foreign markets. Similarly, the US did the same thing in Japan by building a constitutional military alliance with Japan in order to prevent Soviet incursions. Even today, stability in the core states of Western Europe and Japan remains a cornerstone of US hegemonic power. NATO continues to help the hegemony ensure that particular European states do not descend into warfare with one another.

Above and beyond being economically dominant, the hegemonic power’s ability to forge stability at the global scale is dependent upon two types of extra-territorial power over other sovereigns: political and economic. Extra-territorial power begins under the imperatives of economic exploitation, as the hegemony needs open markets to successfully use its dominant economic position and extrapolate surplus capital. It can open markets in numerous ways, most obviously through the threat of, and more rarely the actual use of, force, but most successfully through the establishment of international institutions. By establishing trans-national institutions that incorporate other states but fall under the hegemony’s control, the hegemony is able to exert its sovereignty and wishes over other states while forbidding these same states from infringing on the hegemony’s own sovereignty. The United States has done this more substantially and thoroughly than many past hegemonies. It established economic institutions to help it control other states’ economic policies (e.g., the IMF and GATT). It created an international political institution fronting as a quasi-world government (i.e., the United Nations). Finally, in NATO it forged a trans-Atlantic military alliance to stave off the military threat of the main opposition to its hegemonic power, the Soviet Union.

With institutions of extra-territoriality firmly established in the world-economy, there is yet another more inherent facet to hegemonic power – the prime modernity.

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18 NATO, Nato Handbook.
Taylor defines “prime modernity” as the dominant way of life in the world-economy that is synonymous with the hegemony itself.22 The hegemony’s technological abilities come to be viewed throughout all societies as the epitome of modern, and the hegemony’s lifestyle and methods of socialization become emulated by other societies. Though enticing, the prime modernity is an insidious tool used by the world hegemony to ideologically undermine resistance against US extra-territoriality.23 Prime modernity is centered upon an economic innovation brought about by the hegemony and leading to a change in lifestyle – under Dutch hegemony “mercantilism,” under British hegemony “industrialization,” and with the US “mass consumerism.”24 These economic innovations induce a new modern way of life and socialization that is exported as the path to the future for other states. In essence, the hegemony cajoles other societies into opening their economies and political structures to the capitalist world-economy and into accepting the hegemonic institutions of extra-territoriality through the propagation of the belief that through emulation of the hegemonic way, states will be propelled into the “modern” world – through “development.” Unfortunately, the prime modernity is a mirage, an opulent way of life that is impossible for most societies to ever gain.25 As the prime modernity is built upon exploitive processes for the benefit of the hegemony, exploitation must remain for the prime modernity to exist – thus not every society can “develop.”26 Yet, empty promises aside, the exportation of the “American Dream” remains an inherent aspect of US hegemonic power.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the US quickly found itself in a strategic conundrum – it was a hegemony without any true competition. This dramatic void in
power conflict at the international scale, and the ensuing period of adaptation to it, did not affect the hegemonic state alone, but also the extra-territorial institutions it had established during the height of its hegemony. Suddenly these institutions that had helped to push US sovereignty into other states to protect and spread the “Western way of life” had to redefine their roles in order to stay viable parts of global geopolitics. For many of these institutions, particularly the economic ones, the collapse of communism was a windfall of opportunity and expansion – i.e., the IMF, GATT, WTO, the World Bank, et cetera. With expansive new spaces opening up to capitalist processes, the opportunity for exploitation and spreading the capitalist market increased dramatically. Development of the “Second World” was a top concern, arguably so that East-Central Europe could eventually join “modern Europe.”27 Yet, for other hegemonic institutions, primarily the military alliances forged to prevent the militant spread of global socialism, the end of the Cold War was very confounding. For as the international consensus behind the Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated, there were no clearly identifiable resistances against US hegemony at the global scale.28

As hegemonic institutions went, NATO was one of the most fallible institutions after the bipolar order had ended – standing out as a glaring example of hegemonic influence within Europe. Though still working as a tool for securing Europe from falling into war with itself, long standing skirmishes between Turkey and Greece offered consistent reminders of the fragility of this supposed mission. Though the hegemony would desperately desire to keep NATO as a viable political-military institution, European states could question its need and perhaps see reason to attempt to relinquish the yoke of hegemonic oversight, particularly as more states joined the European Union. In fact, the UK, Germany, and France have continually discussed the possibility of building a Euro Force comprised of soldiers from EU states to be coupled with an EU foreign policy.29 Thus, in order to keep NATO from dissipating completely, the US has

26 Taylor, Modernities: A Geohistorical Interpretation.
27 Agh, "Processes of Democratization in the East Central European and Balkan States."
needed to redefine the organization’s role beyond defending Europe against imperial conquest from the east – NATO needed to take on a higher meaning.

This was done by revamping NATO, not as an anti-communist alliance but, as a military alliance amongst all “modern” (i.e., democratic and open market) European states. NATO changed its role from a military defense and counterattack organization to one of facilitator of peaceful coexistence and builder of trust between democratic nation-states. This transition might have been difficult to swallow for many European states if not for other interdependent organizations’ incompetence in dealing with the Balkan’s crisis. By the mid-1990s both UN peacekeepers and European Union mandates failed to stymie the violent civil wars breaking out in the “powder keg of Europe.” The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, coupled with ethnic tension between numerous nations across Central Europe, made a strong case for an overarching military alliance securing Europe from itself. When NATO was used in the Bosnian conflict it became apparent that within and through this institution members of Western Europe could reach consensus and maintain security for themselves while relying on US hegemonic power.

One method of securing modern Europe from conflicts spilling over from the tensions of Central Europe in the mid-1990s was through the expansion of NATO into states that were stable and developing democratically and further integrating into the capitalist world-economy (i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Just as with previous NATO expansion, contemporary expansion into these states was as much about defending the markets and cultures of a democratic, capitalist Europe as it was about providing security to states threatened by outside nuisances. Yet, for different state actors, the expansion of NATO meant different things.

For Western European states, expansion was largely seen as increasing stability by spreading the buffer zone of mutual security to states that were once part of modern

Europe anyway – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had distinguished histories in European politics and were Catholic as opposed to Orthodox. To Russia, it was seen as an encroachment and semi-hostile action harking back to the Cold War. To Hungary, joining NATO represented less an increase in security – as the Bosnian crisis was not really a serious threat – as much as an opportunity to ascend to the West and join an alliance representing the prime modernity. For the United States, expansion of NATO represented an opportunity to seize upon the acquiescence of the hegemonic contender, the former-Soviet Union, and extend its extra-territorial grip. Moreover, expansion of NATO would concurrently increase stability further inland from the Atlantic, something important now that the bipolar order of the Cold War was past, and the state system was slipping into a perceived period of chaos and ethnic conflict.

In 1998, with little debate and a national referendum placing support at eighty-five percent, the Republic of Hungary bought both the modernity and security facet of NATO expansion, and opted to join the hegemonic military alliance less than ten years after gaining its independence from the Soviet-backed Warsaw Pact. On April 4, 1999, at a ceremony in the heart of US hegemonic politics, Washington, D.C., Hungary was officially admitted into the Western military organization. Having reviewed why the United States strongly supported NATO expansion into Hungary, it is now time to look at the opposite perspective – what did Hungarians see themselves gaining in so strongly supporting their state’s ascension into this extra-territorial institution of the world hegemony?

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31 Agh, "Processes of Democratization in the East Central European and Balkan States."
33 Agh, "Processes of Democratization in the East Central European and Balkan States."
Peter S. Biegelbauer, *130 Years of Catching up with the West* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 2000).
35 Eekelen, "The Security Dimensions of European Integration and the Central-East European States."
Hungary and NATO: Sovereignty versus Interdependence

Hungary was not on perilous ground before joining NATO. As it already had UN and NATO peacekeeping troops stationed on its territory due to the Balkans crisis, any potential spillovers from militant neighbor states were preempted. Threats from neighbors were largely benign – nothing more than the empty rhetoric of right-wing party spokesmen in Slovakia and Romania who had no real power in their countries’ parliamentary processes. It could be argued that desire to join NATO stemmed from the Hungarian state attempting to extend security to the entire Hungarian nation, including the vast diaspora lying in neighboring states and representing 33% of the Hungarian nation’s population. Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia, in particular, were attempting to forcibly assimilate Hungarian ethnic populations – numbering around five million – into their societies, much to the ire of the Hungarian Republic. It was argued by some at the time of NATO expansion that once in the military organization Hungary might hold more political sway and power over its neighbors in leveraging for an end to ethnic tension in less democratic states. However, such an approach on Hungary’s relinquishment of its military sovereignty to the West ignores several larger, external processes influencing the Hungarian decision to join NATO.

From the Magyar point of view, Hungary’s ascension into NATO represents far more than just a simple quest for state security. Though, the perceived benefits of ascension into NATO varied drastically amongst vying political groups and social strata, one underlying trait united a majority of Hungarians – a desire to officially switch sides from the former Eastern modernity of the Soviet empire to a Western modernity as represented by the United States hegemony. Indeed, joining the Western military alliance may not have been so much about “security” of sovereignty as it was about gaining “stability” through interdependence. By joining Western states in this alliance, Hungary

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was solidifying its place as a Western ally in the US hegemonic order – ascribing to the prime modernity.

In Hungary this desire for interdependence with the West was felt across a broad spectrum of the population, largely disregarding peoples’ ideological, class, ethnic, and otherwise divergent backgrounds. In fact, for Hungarians there was little choice but to integrate into the international institution of NATO if continued economic development was desired. Agh believes that in order for small states in Central Europe to maintain their sovereignty in the post-communist era they must adapt to and accept the international, extra-territorial institutions set up in their period of abstinence from the world-economy.  

If Hungary and other states in Central Europe refuse to accept hegemonic and Western institutions (e.g., NATO, the EU, and these organizations’ policies), certain economic and political aspects of these states’ sovereignties may be conveniently ignored by the West entirely (e.g., Serbia’s sovereignty in Kosovo was ignored and then stripped away by NATO). Yet, it should be noted that there is also much to be gained for small states joining such international political structures. For with the backing of the US hegemony and other Western states, Hungary “will certainly have much more influence in the [East-Central European] and Balkan regions from inside NATO than from the outside.”

The importance of increasing the new Hungarian Republic’s interdependence in the world-economy can be analyzed by looking at what various Magyar sub-groups and institutions stood to gain, personally, by supporting Hungary’s ascension into NATO. The rest of this chapter will analyze the dynamics behind three important Hungarian political institutions’ desire to join NATO: the two major Hungarian political parties and the Hungarian military. For the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), attempting to evolve from being the former Hungarian Communist Party, promoting ascension into NATO became its primary political goal in order to completely shed suspicions concerning its former Soviet linkages. To the those of the right, assimilating into NATO provided

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40 Agh, "Processes of Democratization in the East Central European and Balkan States."
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.

insurance against future Russian imperialism, as well as a position of leverage in order to protect Hungarian minorities in states lying adjacent to Hungary but outside of NATO.\textsuperscript{44} Perhaps most importantly, to the Hungarian Armed Forces, NATO expansion offered a means by which to update and redefine its place in Hungarian civil society.\textsuperscript{45}

**Domestic Politics and Interdependence**

The decision to hold a referendum on joining NATO – Hungary is the only state to have done this – was inherently political seeing as no major party was against ascension. Yet, perhaps due to all the hoopla over the referendum’s success, remarkably little was made of the incredible 180 degree turn around for the Hungarian Socialist Party, which was surprisingly willing to surrender Hungary’s sovereignty to the US hegemony only six years after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{46} The former-Communist Party had spent nearly four years preparing Hungary for ascension and had pushed the policy through with stunning success. The HSP’s ability to move Hungary into NATO represented a triumphant shedding of the communist legacy plaguing the party.

In the first democratic elections of 1990, the revamped communists, conveniently renaming themselves the Hungarian Socialist Party, had a very difficult time appealing to the electorate, taking only five-percent of the national vote and barely gaining representation in parliament. However, by the national election of 1994, the economic struggles of transition to an open market economy were weighing heavily on the population. The Socialists had revamped themselves as professionals and technocrats, who knew how to best solve the problems of transition facing Hungary’s workforce, yet

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\textsuperscript{44} Eekelen, "The Security Dimensions of European Integration and the Central-East European States."


\textsuperscript{46} Bigler, "Back in Europe and Adjusting to the New Realities of the 1990s in Hungary."
at the same time could best integrate Hungary into modern Europe.\textsuperscript{47} This turnaround in posture was an explicit strategy of the former-communists to save liberal socialism from dissolving entirely. By revamping the party as anti-communism but pro-labor, while at the same time appealing to those aspiring to be Western by arguing that Hungary’s rightful place was in “modern” Europe, the Socialists came to dominate the elections of 1994.\textsuperscript{48}

Through consistent and incessant lobbying during its four years in power (1994-1998), the HSP easily garnered enough national support for NATO expansion and integration into the European Union. This strategy successfully severed the already rusty connection the party maintained to the old Soviet modernity, but it came at a heavy price. In May of 1998, six months after the successful NATO referendum, the HSP lost the national elections to FIDESZ (The Young Democrats Party). Though not opposed to NATO expansion or EU ascension, FIDESZ played to the xenophobic rhetoric card just enough to bump the triumphant socialists out of the government. Perhaps due to its progressive and pro-West stance, during its reign the HSP had beleaguered the labor market, which felt its needs were being circumvented for the benefit of foreign firms. FIDESZ appealed to voters suffering from economic transition with xenophobic rhetoric about the HSP selling the country to foreigners. In a twist of irony, the socialists suddenly became the cosmopolitan, pro-West party attempting to guide Hungary to the new modernity, whereas the right began seizing the labor vote. Thus, during their first tenure in power, the Socialists firmly established their party’s position as pro-West, admonishing many communist hangovers, but this success came at a heavy cost; the state ascended into a modern Western institution, but the party lost control of the state apparatus to a party that Magyars viewed as more “national.”

Upon the Young Democrats Party’s (FIDESZ) successful election to government in 1998, questions concerning loss of national sovereignty and how much of Hungary’s resources had been sold to foreign companies under the socialist regime became increasingly vocalized. Though initially its political policies were definitively pro-West,

\textsuperscript{47} Ziblatt, "The Adaptation of Ex-Communist Parties to Post-Communist East Central Europe."
\textsuperscript{48} Bigler, "Back in Europe and Adjusting to the New Realities of the 1990s in Hungary."
Ziblatt, "The Adaptation of Ex-Communist Parties to Post-Communist East Central Europe."
upon taking power FIDESZ began to become more cognizant of the growing Hungarian constituency that was distrustful of the previous socialist government’s reforms. Thus, FIDESZ became more unilateral and started panning to the right by displaying occasional dissatisfaction with the West. This gradual but serious political shift may have been induced from the fact that in the same elections propelling FIDESZ to power, the extremely nationalist, isolationist, Hungarian Truth and Light Party (HTLP) also gained a handful of seats in Parliament. The HTLP party was elected on a platform of anti-semitism, anti-NATO policies, anti-Europeanization, and a vocal desire to annex territory from neighboring states that contained ethnic Hungarians (i.e., Transylvania in Romania, the southern quarter of Slovakia, and Vojvodina in Serbia). Thus, less than six months after the successful referendum, the internal dynamics of Hungarian politics quickly changed to reflect more public skepticism over NATO expansion than had previously existed.

FIDESZ gained from NATO expansion, because immediately thereafter it was able to play both the cosmopolitan, pro-West card (upon which its party platform rested) while concurrently shifting toward the right, by expressing concern that the socialists had sold out to the West. Thus, though it initially supported NATO expansion, over the next four years of power, it increasingly found itself caught in the bind of trying to appease Western supporters while at the same time picking up support from the right. This was done primarily through the increasingly unilateral leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, which eventually began to erode Hungary’s partnership with the West. Before long, Orban was condemned by various states and international political institutions. Thus, though taking over and riding the success of NATO expansion at the beginning of its run at the helm of parliament, over the next four years FIDESZ lost international support for its leadership of Hungary.

Interdependence can affect domestic politics, as FIDESZ discovered in the elections of 2002. The displeasure of other NATO member states with Hungary may have been the catalyst in FIDESZ’s electoral loss. A month before the elections ousting FIDESZ from power, Prime Minister Orban visited Washington, D.C. only to be snubbed by President Bush.49 Only three years prior, NATO had helped the recently elected party

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gain recognition from the US and core European states. Yet, over the following years NATO played a considerable role in the party’s loss of power. Other NATO member states continually lambasted Hungary, under Orban’s leadership, for not pulling its weight in the alliance. Due to external pressures, the originally progressive FIDESZ party lost its internal legitimacy to govern four more years, narrowly losing to the HSP in the general elections of 2002.\textsuperscript{50}

**The Magyar Military**

If any part of the state apparatus was pro-NATO during the initial ascension proceedings, it was the Hungarian military. The fall of communism was difficult on the Hungarian Armed Forces. A conscription based force, its bases were in ill repair, its supplies antiquated, its machinery largely consisted of aging Soviet technology, and its role in civil-society at large was lacking definition.\textsuperscript{51} Morale became exceedingly low in the army, with whole groups of soldiers deserting due to low pay and squalid living conditions (e.g., four officers per dormitory room).\textsuperscript{52} As the HSP began preparing to apply for NATO membership in the mid-1990s, the military was a firm supporter of the measure. NATO membership required extensive updating of military infrastructure and weaponry, which the Hungarian military would otherwise never receive through standard budgets and upgrades.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, collective security would reduce the risk of potential conflict spilling over from neighboring states – something which Hungary was not entirely prepared to defend against on its own.\textsuperscript{54}

The Hungarian military was suffering from a crisis of identity after 45 years of being a pawn to the Soviet Empire; its place in Hungarian society was contestable.\textsuperscript{55} Though officially transferred to civilian control – under the leadership of the President – the military was loathed by much of Hungarian society and found little financial security

\textsuperscript{51} Agocs, "A Dispirited Army."
\textsuperscript{53} Agocs, "A Dispirited Army."
\textsuperscript{54} Yaniszewski, "Post-Communist Civil-Military Reform in Poland and Hungary."
\textsuperscript{55} Eekelen, "The Security Dimensions of European Integration and the Central-East European States."
\textsuperscript{55} Agocs, "A Dispirited Army."
\textsuperscript{56} Szenes, "The Implications of Nato Expansion for Civil-Military Relations in Hungary."
in parliament.\textsuperscript{56} The ranks were full of corruption and bribery, with serious breaches in security taking place.\textsuperscript{57} The mandatory conscription laws were continuously debated and changed – from a two-year tour, down to six-months, then up to eighteen-months, and back down to a year. Since the military could find little stability as an institution functioning within its own state, it eventually lobbied to promote its envelopment into a larger, pan-European force with the backing of the US hegemony.\textsuperscript{58}

By lobbying to join NATO, the Hungarian Armed Forces were appealing to an aspect of Hungarians’ sense of modernity. For the Western military alliance represented high-tech and modern armies capable of swooping in with their machinery and technology to devastate peripheral militaries – as well observed in Bosnia. The Hungarian Armed Forces argued that their ability to defend the state would become obsolete without NATO. In the long run, after an initial major investment to upgrade the numerous realms in which the Hungarian military was behind, expenditures would be considerably lower for Hungary with the mutual security of NATO as opposed to defending the state alone. Thus, in this way the military was able to appeal to both the nationalist heartbeat – defending the nation-state – while at the same time promoting the relinquishment of Hungarian sovereignty.

Ironically, having received what it desired, ascension into NATO and increased funding to upgrade to Western standards, the military was then slighted by their own success. Prime Minister Orban enthusiastically embraced increased funding for the military at the beginning of the FIDESZ government in 1998. However, having been accepted to the NATO club, parliamentary excitement over funding the upgrading of Hungary’s military – an increasingly expensive task in a state plagued with the financial difficulties of transforming to the open market economy – began to wane.\textsuperscript{59} This waning has continued to occur to the point where Hungary is now known as one of the NATO

\textsuperscript{56} Agocs, "A Dispirited Army."
\textsuperscript{57} Bebler, "Corruption among Security Personnel in Central and Eastern Europe."
\textsuperscript{58} Eekelen, "The Security Dimensions of European Integration and the Central-East European States."
members least committed to meeting the technology and reform requirements established in the ascension treaty.  

As has been shown, different political institutions within the Hungarian political milieu had varying, and vying, reasons to join NATO, but one concept was underlying all – an urge to be conceived of as modern. For the socialists, it represented a break from its past affiliation with the now defunct Soviet modernity. For FIDESZ membership offered a chance for recognition from the epitome of world modernity and power, the US hegemony, and an opportunity for FIDESZ to illuminate its nationalist policies as having the implicit backing of the US and West. For the Hungarian military, it offered a chance to redefine its role at the national and international scale and raise morale as it became associated with the world hegemony. In the end, though all of these institutions’ were affected in different ways after NATO ascension, they were all influenced by the prime modernity and a desire to participate in a Kantian peace with the West.

**NATO as Process and Hungary as Space of Opportunism**

In November 2002, as NATO encroached to the border of Russia by adding seven new states, the same processes were at work as during the first post-Cold War expansion in 1999. The US as world hegemony continues to expand its institutions of extra-territoriality into new territories. Moreover, states in Central Europe that hope to better their position within the world-economy have little choice but to acquiesce to the onslaught of US extra-territoriality or be excluded from modern Europe. Today there is no state-based ideological opposition to United States prime modernity for states to turn to; states in transition can join the West or become further peripheralized.

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60 John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft, "Saving Nato's Foundation," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (1999).  
Jordan, "Iraqi Exile Meeting Rattles Hungarian Town."  
Celeste A. Wallander, "Nato's Price: Shape up or Ship Out," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 6 (2002).  
61 The seven new states were: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
Krauthammer, "The Bold Road to Nato Expansion."
As NATO faces irrelevance, it continues to redefine itself and operate as a tool of the US – even in the face of opposition from other extra-territorial institutions. The United States used NATO in Kosovo even though the United Nations had voted against force. Today the US hopes to use NATO for anti-terrorist operations and in multi-lateral campaigns against those not conforming to open market and democratic principles – essentially those resisting the hegemony’s extra-territorial powers. Though European opposition and angst with US hegemony occasionally rises within NATO (e.g., European opposition to US policies in the conflict over Palestine), many European member states will continue to pay homage to the US hegemony and its military institution for some time.

Meanwhile, the new member states will be afforded an opportunity to become defenders of the modern world without needing to supply much in the way of military muscle. Instead, new member states are used for “niche” purposes (e.g., poison gas experts, mountain soldiers, et cetera) and for the general stabilization of Europe as a whole.64 Also, new member states provide ever-expanding territorial range for military operations and new spaces for US training.65 A prime example of this is Hungary. Before the Anglo-American incursion into Iraq in 2003, Hungary offered one of its military bases for the United States to train an Iraqi militia.66 Once again, the implication of such hegemonic extra-territoriality varies in benefit and impact for different Magyars. The Republic of Hungary has gained millions of dollars in aid by allowing the US and other NATO states to use its military bases during various Balkan crises and in

63 Agh, "Processes of Democratization in the East Central European and Balkan States."
DeYoung and Richburg, "Nato Approves New Direction."
Farnam, "Seven Nations Hope to Find a Niche in Nato."
Tom Squitieri, "Useful 'Niche' Skills Sought from New Member Nations," USA Today, November 22, 2002.
65 Fisher, "Romania, Wooed by U.S., Looks to a Big Nato Role."
Jordan, "Iraqi Exile Meeting Rattles Hungarian Town."
Jordan, "Iraqi Exile Meeting Rattles Hungarian Town."
MacAskill and Traynor, "Threat of War."
preparation for war with Iraq. However, the local Magyar villagers near the base are continually offset and disgruntled by the foreign presence, particularly recently – “It’s not that we’re afraid of foreigners coming here – we’re used to it. But they’re Arabs, it’s different.” Nonetheless, the Hungarian government is happy to put Hungary in the hegemony’s good graces again. Moreover, the Hungarian military can always use the influx of capital to help revamp its antiquated military. In return, Hungary contributes remarkably little in exchange for what it receives from its membership in NATO: security, military development, capital investment, and the ear of the hegemony.

In recent years a conflict has been growing between an increasingly integrated EU and the United States over the role of NATO. Continued conflicts of interest have begun to chip away at the established foundations of Kantian peace within the military organization. The universalist ideal – cemented by the prime modernity over the past half century – has begun to erode within this zone of peace, and increasingly the hegemony faces difficulty keeping member states in tow behind its leadership. Contemporary events have made this chasm all the more apparent, with US political rhetoric divisively naming those states adhering to US policies as the “new Europe” and dismissively labeling those states against US agendas as part of “old Europe.” Perhaps not too ironically, “old Europe” primarily consists of the most powerful European Union members, who in the near future very well may attempt to forge an independent foreign policy separate from the one that the US hegemony leads. Such an Atlantic rift could place new NATO members, such as Hungary, in quite a diplomatic predicament. French President Chirac has threatened Central European governments of vetoing their ascension into the EU due to their support of the US position in NATO’s rift over the war in Iraq, calling the Central European states “poorly brought up.” Such a collision between core interests within NATO may represent an aspect of a larger process – the decline of US hegemony. If NATO, as a hegemonic institution of extra-territoriality and a Kantian zone of peace, begins to crumble under the stress of inter-state competition against the

68 Jordan, "Iraqi Exile Meeting Rattles Hungarian Town."
world hegemony, perhaps so too will the stability that the US hegemonic order has traditionally provided to the world. The question for future studies may then become: have Central European states hopped on the USS Interdependence just in time to watch it sink?
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